

# Rejection-free Framework of Zero-Knowledge Proof based on (Hint-)Module Learning with Errors

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# Proving without revealing

Zero-Knowledge



The context is public

$\pi = (\text{com}(s), c, \text{resp}(s, c))$



Completeness

$\mathcal{V}$  accepts  $\pi$  if  $s$  is valid

(Know.) Soundness

If  $\mathcal{V}$  accepts  $\pi$  then  $s$  is valid

Zero-Knowledge

$\mathcal{V}$  does not gain info. with  $\pi$


# Proving without revealing

Commit-and-prove



The context is public

$\pi = (\text{com}(s), c, \text{resp}(s, c))$   
+ (additional\_material)



**Completeness**

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
**Zero-Knowledge**

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# An idea of a lattice based ZK proof

Knowledge of an Ajtai opening

**A**




Smalls  $\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{y}$

$\mathbf{t} = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{w} = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{y}$

small  $c$

$\mathbf{z} = c\mathbf{s} + \mathbf{y}$




Verifier  $\mathcal{V}$

$\mathbf{A}\mathbf{z} \stackrel{?}{=} c\mathbf{t} + \mathbf{w} \wedge \mathbf{z}$  is small

# An idea of a lattice based ZK proof



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Verifier  $\mathcal{V}$

$\mathbf{A}\mathbf{z} \stackrel{?}{=} c\mathbf{t} + \mathbf{w} \wedge \mathbf{z}$  is small

**The protocol is not zero-knowledge**


If  $c$  is small then it will more likely leak information about  $c\mathbf{s}$  and therefore  $\mathbf{s}$ .

# Transmitting without revealing

## Rejection Sampling [Lyu09]:

**GOAL:** Artificially controlling output distribution of the responses  $\text{resp}(\mathbf{s}, c)$ .

1. **Prover** aborts and restarts the entire protocol when  $\text{resp}(\mathbf{s}, c)$  leaks info about  $\mathbf{s}$
2. **Verifier** sees a publicly known distribution from its point of view.




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
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## Problems


1. Non constant time as the prover can't predict the rejection,
2. Must involve **costly masking** to protect it from side-channel attacks.

# Contribution




A Commit-and-prove framework of proof **secure based on rejection sampling**.

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
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
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


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# Lattice assumption

**Module Learning With Errors (MLWE) [Reg05,LS15]:**

Consider  $\mathcal{R} = \mathbb{Z}[X]/\langle X^d + 1 \rangle$  for  $d$  a power of two,  $\mathcal{R}_q = \mathcal{R}/q\mathcal{R}$  with  $q$  an integer.



$$\mathbf{A} \leftarrow \mathcal{U}(\mathcal{R}^{m \times n})$$

$$\mathbf{b} \in \mathcal{R}^m$$

Public matrices and vectors

$$\mathbf{s} \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{R}^n, \sigma_s}, \mathbf{e} \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{R}^m, \sigma_e}$$

Discrete Gaussians


[Reg05] On lattices, Learning With Errors, random linear codes, and cryptography; Regev, 2005

[LS15] Worst-Case to Average-Case Reductions for Module Lattices; Langlois and Stehlé, 2015

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**Module Learning With Errors (MLWE) with hints about the secret/error: Hint-MLWE [KLSS23]**

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
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$$\mathbf{b} \in \mathcal{R}^m, \mathbf{z} \in \mathcal{R}^{n+m}$$

Discrete Gaussians

Public matrices and vectors

MLWE  $\implies$  Hint-MLWE [KLSS23], when secrets and errors follow Discrete Gaussians.

## Our modification of the framework

In ours:

$$\tilde{\mathbf{z}} := c \tilde{\mathbf{s}} + \tilde{\mathbf{y}}$$

- Use  $\tilde{\mathbf{z}}$  as hint in Hint-MLWE ensuring that it is built on a Gaussian element.

In [LNP22]:

$$\mathbf{z} := c \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{y}$$

- Use **rejection sampling** to ensure **zero-knowledge**.

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[LNP22] Lattice-Based Zero-Knowledge Proofs and Applications: Shorter, Simpler, and More General; Lyubashevsky, Nguyen, and Plançon, 2022

[HSS24] Concretely Efficient Lattice-based Polynomial Commitment from Standard Assumptions; Hwang, Seo, and Song, 2024

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$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{s} &:= \begin{bmatrix} 1 & b & \cdots & b^k & & \mathbf{0} \\ & & & & \ddots & \\ & & & & & 1 & b & \cdots & b^k \end{bmatrix} \tilde{\mathbf{s}} \text{ with } \tilde{\mathbf{s}} = \begin{bmatrix} \tilde{s}_0 \\ \vdots \\ \tilde{s}_k \end{bmatrix} \\ &=: \mathbf{G}_b \text{ with } k = \lfloor \log_b q \rfloor - 1 \end{aligned}$$

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Take a prime integer  $q = b^2 + 1$ , e.g. we take  $17 = 4^2 + 1$ .

Let  $\mathbf{s} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 7 & -1 \end{bmatrix}$  decomposed in base 4 as  $\hat{\mathbf{s}} = \begin{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 \end{bmatrix} & \begin{bmatrix} 3 & 1 \end{bmatrix} & \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 4 \end{bmatrix} \end{bmatrix}$  (L to R).

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We add a Gaussian error sampled from  $\{\mathbf{x} \mid \mathbf{G}_b \mathbf{x} = \mathbf{0}\}$  centred in  $\mathbf{0}$ .

- Here, consider the Gaussian sampled element  $\hat{\mathbf{e}} = \begin{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 5 & 3 \end{bmatrix} & \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 4 \end{bmatrix} & \begin{bmatrix} -4 & 7 \end{bmatrix} \end{bmatrix}$ .

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We finally compute:  $\tilde{\mathbf{s}} = \hat{\mathbf{s}} + \hat{\mathbf{e}} = \begin{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 6 & 3 \end{bmatrix} & \begin{bmatrix} 4 & 5 \end{bmatrix} & \begin{bmatrix} -4 & 11 \end{bmatrix} \end{bmatrix}$ , Gaussian centred in  $\hat{\mathbf{s}}$ .

# Our modification of the framework

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Let  $q = 17$  and  $b = 4$ .

$$\begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 7 \\ -1 \end{bmatrix} := \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 4 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 4 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 4 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} 6 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5 \\ -4 \\ 11 \end{bmatrix} \pmod{17}$$

# Our modification of the framework

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- Use  $\tilde{\mathbf{z}}$  as hint in **Hint-MLWE** ensuring that it is built on a Gaussian element.
- Use the Gaussianised  $\tilde{\mathbf{s}} = \text{Gauss}(\mathbf{s})$  (such that  $\mathbf{G}_b \tilde{\mathbf{s}} = \mathbf{s}$ ) using [HSS24].

$$\mathbf{s} := \sum_{0 \leq i < \lfloor \log_b q \rfloor} b^i \tilde{\mathbf{s}}_i + \sum_{0 \leq i < \lfloor \log_b q \rfloor} b^i \hat{\mathbf{e}}_i = \sum_{0 \leq i < \lfloor \log_b q \rfloor} b^i \tilde{\mathbf{s}}_i$$

Base- $b$  decomposition      Gaussian error over  $\Lambda_q^\perp(\mathbf{G}_b)$

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- Use the Gaussianised  $\tilde{\mathbf{s}} = \mathbf{Gauss}(\mathbf{s})$  (such that  $\mathbf{G}_b \tilde{\mathbf{s}} = \mathbf{s}$ ) using **[HSS24]**.
- With the naive construction: Use  $\tilde{\mathbf{z}}$  to prove relations over  $\tilde{\mathbf{s}}$ .

In **[LNP22]**:

$$\mathbf{z} := \mathbf{c} \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{y}$$

- Use **rejection sampling** to ensure **zero-knowledge**.
- Use  $\mathbf{z}$  to prove relations over  $\mathbf{s}$ .

## Our modification of the framework

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- What we did: Use  $\tilde{\mathbf{z}}$  to prove relations over  $\mathbf{s}$ .

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## Extension to a commit-and-prove protocol

*Black-box use to prove different relations*

By just committing  $\mathbf{s}$ , we consider public relations over  $\mathbf{x} := [\mathbf{s}, \sigma_{-1}(\mathbf{s})]$ .

$$\mathbf{x}^\top \mathbf{R}_2 \mathbf{x} + \mathbf{r}_1^\top \mathbf{x} + r = t$$

$$\mathbf{R}\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{t}$$

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Some usecases and examples:

- Constant coeff of  $(\mathbf{s}^\top \sigma_{-1}(\mathbf{s}))[0]$  is equal to  $\langle \vec{s}, \vec{s} \rangle$  i.e. the constant coefficient of the quadratic relation for  $\mathbf{R}_2 = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{0} & \mathbf{0} \\ \mathbf{I} & \mathbf{0} \end{bmatrix}$ ,  $\mathbf{r}_1 = \mathbf{0}$  and  $r = 0$ .
- Knowledge of  $\mathbf{A}\mathbf{s} = \mathbf{0}$  such that  $0 < \|\mathbf{s}\| < \beta$  ( $\mathbf{s}$  is a SIS solution),
- For the norm  $\|\mathbf{s}\| < \beta \iff \beta^2 - (\mathbf{s}^\top \sigma(\mathbf{s}))[0] > 0$  + proof of no-wraparound.

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$$\text{As } \sigma(\tilde{\mathbf{s}}) = \widetilde{\sigma_{-1}(\mathbf{s})} \text{ then } \tilde{\mathbf{x}} := [\tilde{\mathbf{s}}, \sigma_{-1}(\tilde{\mathbf{s}})]$$

Modifying relations over  $\mathbf{s}$  to relation over  $\tilde{\mathbf{s}}$ : remind that  $\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{G}_b \tilde{\mathbf{x}}$ .

- In [LNP22]: use  $\mathbf{z} = c\mathbf{s} + \mathbf{y}$  to prove  $\mathbf{x}^\top \mathbf{R}_2 \mathbf{x} + \mathbf{r}_1^\top \mathbf{x} + r_0 = 0$ .
- Exploit the same strategy  $\tilde{\mathbf{z}} = c\tilde{\mathbf{s}} + \tilde{\mathbf{y}}$  to prove  $\tilde{\mathbf{x}}^\top \mathbf{R}_2 \tilde{\mathbf{x}} + \mathbf{r}_1^\top \tilde{\mathbf{x}} + r_0 = 0$ .

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- Both the relation and  $\mathbf{G}_b$  are public, we use  $\tilde{\mathbf{z}}$  to prove  $\mathbf{x}^\top \mathbf{R}_2 \mathbf{x} + \mathbf{r}_1^\top \mathbf{x} + r_0 = 0$  by proving the equivalent relation  $\tilde{\mathbf{x}}^\top (\mathbf{G}_b^\top \mathbf{R}_2 \mathbf{G}_b) \tilde{\mathbf{x}} + (\mathbf{r}_1^\top \mathbf{G}_b) \tilde{\mathbf{x}} + r = 0$ .

# Conclusion

- A rejection-free alternative to prove computable relations,
- Without restriction to norm-bounded secret **but** not extendable to norm relations,
- Implementation usable (as an addon) of the LaZer library from [LSS24]:

Protocol	Phase	$(p \approx 2^{60}, m = 12)$	$(p \approx 2^{80}, m = 120)$
[LNP22]	Prove	324.22	4462.29
		<b>59.45</b>	<b>3961.24</b>
[LNP22]	Verify	18.54	1629.12
		<b>41.74</b>	<b>3624.34</b>

Mean times (in million cycles), with  $p$  the moduli and  $m$  the size of the secret.

[LNP22] Lattice-Based Zero-Knowledge Proofs and Applications: Shorter, Simpler, and More General; Lyubashevsky, Nguyen, and Plançon, 2022

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Verifying phase  
at most  $\times 3$

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Protocol	Phase	$(p \approx 2^{60}, m = 12)$	$(p \approx 2^{80}, m = 120)$	
[LNP22]	Prove	324.22	4462.29	<b>Proving phase</b> at most $\times \frac{3}{\text{rej. rate}}$
		<b>59.45</b>	<b>3961.24</b>	
Ours	Verify	18.54	1629.12	
		<b>41.74</b>	<b>3624.34</b>	

Mean times (in million cycles), with  $p$  the moduli and  $m$  the size of the secret.

[LNP22] Lattice-Based Zero-Knowledge Proofs and Applications: Shorter, Simpler, and More General; Lyubashevsky, Nguyen, and Plançon, 2022

[LSS24] The LaZer Library: Lattice-Based Zero Knowledge and Succinct Proofs for Quantum-Safe Privacy; Lyubashevsky, Seiler, and Steuer, 2024